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SIXTH AMENDMENT-WAIVER AFTER
REQUEST FOR COUNSEL
Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986).
I. INTRODUCTION
In its 1985 Term, the United States Supreme Court established
a new test to determine the validity of a defendant's waiver of his
sixth amendment right to the assistance of counsel.' In Michigan v.
Jackson,2 the Court, relying on Edwards v. Arizona,3 held that when a
defendant asserts his right to counsel at an arraignment or similar
proceeding, any subsequent waiver of this right during police inter-
rogation must be preceded by communication initiated by the
defendant.
4
In applying the Edwards rule to sixth amendment waivers, the
Court strengthened the sixth amendment waiver standard for de-
fendants who have requested counsel. The sixth amendment guar-
antee, unlike its fifth amendment counterpart, does not hinge on
such a request, however. As a result, the Court's holding leaves sev-
eral issues unsettled. The Court, by limiting the application ofJack-
son to those defendants who request counsel, must still determine
what protections are due to those who do not request a lawyer. Fur-
ther, the Court must clearly define "initiation" in the sixth amend-
ment context.5
After reviewing Jackson, this Note explores the history of the
sixth amendment right, comparing it to the development of the fifth
I "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." U.S CONST. amend. VI.
2 106 S. Ct. 1404 (1986).
3 451 U.S. 477 (1981). In Edwards, the Court held that if a suspect requests counsel
during custodial interrogation, the police cannot continue to interrogate him unless the
suspect initiates communication with the police and then validly waives his right to coun-
sel. Id. at 484, 485. See also Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638 (1984). The right to counsel
implicated in the Edwards scenario is based on the fifth amendment right against com-
pelled self-incrimination as developed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
right to counsel implicated in Jackson, however, is based on the sixth amendment. The
distinction between these rights is explained below. See infra notes 60-83 and accompa-
nying text.
4 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1411.
5 The Court has defined "initiation" for the fifth amendment in Oregon v. Brad-
shaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). See infra note 59 and text accompanying notes 143-147.
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amendment right. A discussion of the sixth amendment waiver doc-
trine follows. Next, the Note discusses the shortcomings of theJack-
son rule and suggests answers to unresolved questions. Finally, this
Note argues that the rule enunciated in Jackson indicates that the
Court has continued to emphasize the relinquishment aspect of the
sixth amendment right, thereby ignoring whether a defendant fully
comprehends the benefits of the right he is waiving.
6
II. BACKGROUND
In the companion case to Jackson, the defendant, Rudy Bladel,
was arrested and arraigned in connection with the murder of three
Amtrak employees in Jackson, Michigan. 7 At his arraignment,
Bladel requested that counsel be appointed. Prior to meeting with
counsel,8 though, two police officers re-questioned Bladel,9 at which
time he again requested counsel.' 0 Without knowing that a lawyer
had been appointed for him, however, Bladel agreed to the ques-
tioning, signed a waiver form and subsequently confessed to the
murders.I' The trial court admitted his confession despite Bladel's
objection and convicted him of first degree murder.' 2 On appeal,
the Michigan Court of Appeals first affirmed the conviction,' 3 but
after reconsideration, reversed and remanded.' 4 The Michigan
Supreme Court granted appeal and considered the case with de-
6 There are two prongs to waiver of the sixth amendment: relinquishment and com-
prehension. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977). These concepts are ex-
plained more fully below. See infra text accompanying notes 102-23.
7 People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 44-45, 365 N.W.2d 56, 58-59 (1984).
8 A notice of appointment of counsel was promptly mailed to a law firm which did
not receive it until several days later. Bladel was questioned in the interim by officers
who apparently were not aware of Bladel's request. However, the detective in charge of
the investigation was present at Bladel's arraignment and, hence, knew of the request.
Michigan v.Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1406 (1986).
9 The police, before questioning Bladel, read him his Miranda rights as delineated
by the Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). In Miranda, the Court held
that police must inform an accused that he has the right to remain silent, that any state-
ment he makes may be used as evidence against him, that he has the right to counsel,
and that one will be appointed for him if he is indigent. Id. at 444.
10 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1406.
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 People v. Bladel, 106 Mich. App. 397, 403, 308 N.W.2d 230, 233 (1981).
14 People v. Bladel, 118 Mich. App. 498, 500, 325 N.W.2d 421, 422 (1982). The
Michigan Court of Appeals reconsidered in light of the decision of the Michigan
Supreme Court in People v. Paintman, 412 Mich. 518, 315 N.W.2d 418 (1982), holding
that an accused's fifth and fourteenth amendments rights are violated by admission of
inculpatory statements where the accused has requested counsel after arrest but never-
theless was interrogated. Paintman, 412 Mich. at 526, 315 N.W.2d at 420; cf. Edwards,
451 U.S. 477 (1981).
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fendant Jackson.15
Jackson was arrested and arraigned as one of four participants
in a woman's plan to kill her husband. 16 During arraignment, Jack-
son, like Bladel, requested the assistance of counsel, but before
meeting with counsel, two police officers re-questioned him17 to
"confirm" his involvement in the murder.' 8 The officers informed
Jackson of his Miranda rights, and he agreed to the questioning in
the absence of counsel.' 9 The trial court admitted Jackson's post-
arraignment confession into evidence and convicted him of second-
degree murder.20 The Court of Appeals upheld the conviction and
held that the statements were properly admitted.21 The Michigan
Supreme Court granted leave to appeal.
22
The Michigan Supreme Court held that the post-arraignment
confessions should have been excluded because they were obtained
in the absence of counsel and violated both defendants' sixth
amendment rights. 23 The court also held that the Edwards rule for
fifth amendment waivers during custodial interrogation 24 applied by
analogy when an accused requests counsel before the arraigning
magistrate. 25 Therefore, if an accused requests counsel at arraign-
ment, police may not interrogate him further unless the accused ini-
tiates communication with the police and then makes a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver of both his fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights.26
III. THE OPINIONS OF THE COURT
A. THE MAJORITY
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Stevens,
affirmed the Michigan Supreme Court's decision. The Court first
noted that the question inJackson was not whether the defendants
15 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1406.
16 People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 48, 365 N.W.2d 56, 60 (1984). Prior to arraign-
ment, Jackson admitted to participation in the murder scheme. Id., 365 N.W.2d at 60.
17 Unlike the officers in Bladel's case, these officers were present atJackson's arraign-
ment and thus knew of his request for counsel. Id. at 49, 365 N.W.2d at 61.
18 Id., 365 N.W.2d at 61.
19 Id., 365 N.W.2d at 61.
20 Id., 365 N.W.2d at 61.
21 People v.Jackson, 114 Mich. App. 649, 658-59, 319 N.W.2d 613, 616-17 (1982).
22 Bladel, 421 Mich. at 50, 365 N.W.2d at 61.
23 Id. at 66, 365 N.W.2d at 69.
24 See supra note 3.
25 Bladel, 421 Mich. at 65, 66, 365 N.W.2d at 68, 69 (footnote ommitted). The court,
however, did not confront the situation in which the defendant fails to request counsel.
Id. at 66 n.22, 365 N.W.2d at 69 n.22.
26 See id. at 66, 365 N.W.2d at 69.
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had a right to counsel at the post-arraignment interrogations, but
whether they had validly waived their rights.27 The majority then
turned to Edwards, where the Court held that after an accused as-
serts his right to counsel at a custodial interrogation, 28 the interro-
gation must stop unless the accused initiates further communication
with the police. 29 While Edwards was based on the fifth amendment
right to counsel, because the defendant's request for counsel there
was made during custodial interrogation, the requests for counsel in
Jackson were made at arraignment, providing support for the Michi-
gan court's decision to rely on the sixth amendment guarantee.30
Hence, the question was really whether the Court should extend its
fifth amendment Edwards rule to the sixth amendment. Justice Ste-
vens, refuting the State's arguments, decided that such an extension
was necessary to preserve the efficacy of the sixth amendment.
31
The State first contended that Edwards should not be extended
to the sixth amendment because of legal differences between the
fifth and sixth amendment rights to counsel. 32 Justice Stevens
found these differences irrelevant since "the reasons for prohibiting
the interrogation of an uncounseled prisoner who has asked for the
help of a lawyer are even stronger after he has been formally
charged with an offense than before."3 3 The initiation of adversary
judicial proceedings, and the concurrent attachment of the sixth
amendment right to counsel, indicates that the adverse positions of
the defendant and the government have solidified.3 4 Further, once
27 Michigan v.Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1407-08 (1986). The court realized that this
right to counsel derived from both the fifth and sixth amendments. Id. The fifth amend-
ment right to counsel, designed to protect against compelled self-incrimination, attaches
when an accused requests counsel at a "custodial interrogation." Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 482 (1981); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966). The sixth
amendment right, on the other hand, attaches at the outset of "adversary judicial pro-
ceedings" and no request is needed. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187
(1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972).
28 "Custodial interrogation" usually refers to questioning of a suspect before formal
charges have been made or before the intiation of adversary judicial proceedings. See
M11iranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Kirby, 406 U.S. at 687-90. Hence, the sixth amendment right
to counsel has yet to attach and only the fifth amendment right is implicated. See Kirby,
406 U.S. at 689-90.
29 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 485.
30 See Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1408. The Court, in a footnote, stated that the Michigan
court held that only the sixth amendment applied to both Jackson and Bladel because
their requests were made at arraignment and not at custodial interrogation. The Court
noted that it expressed "no comment on the validity of the Michigan court's Fifth
Amendment analysis." Id. at 1408 n.4.
31 Id. at 1411.
32 Id. at 1408.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 1408-09.
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the defendant has been formally charged, he faces "the
prosecutorial forces of organized society." 35 Since the "suspect"
has now become an "accused" and is protected by the sixth amend-
ment, police must refrain from using various investigatory tech-
niques, such as electronic surveillance, that they could have used
prior to arraignment.3 6 The majority concluded that the protections
afforded by the sixth amendment are at least as important as those
guaranteed by the fifth amendment, making any legal difference be-
tween the two unimportant.
3 7
Justice Stevens also rejected the state's argument that factual
differences between a request at a custodial interrogation and at an
arraignment indicate that the Edwards rule should not be ex-
tended.3 8 He noted that an accused who makes a request at the ar-
raignment desires a lawyer's aid, not only at formal legal
proceedings, but at all confrontations between the state and the ac-
cused.3 9 The Court, therefore, refused to view each request nar-
rowly, since most defendants are unaware of the differences
between their fifth and sixth amendment rights.40 Justice Stevens,
however, noted that the sixth amendment right to counsel does not
hinge on a request for counsel, but is simply viewed "as an ex-
tremely important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent
waiver in response to police-initiated interrogation.
'" 41
The State also emphasized another factual difference: while po-
lice obviously know of a request for counsel made during custodial
interrogations, they might not be aware of a similar request made at
arraignment.42 Thus, the State claimed, the Edwards rule would not
work in the sixth amendment context. Justice Stevens disagreed be-
cause the sixth amendment "concerns the confrontation between
the State and the individual," thereby imputing knowledge of a re-
quest made at arraignment to the police.43 Further, Edwards created
a simple, "bright-line" rule, and adopting it for sixth amendment
35 Id at 1408 (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189 (1984)). The
Court has commonly used this phrase to indicate that the sixth amendment right has
attached and to emphasize the importance of that right in providing a guarantee to a fair
trial.
3 6 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1409.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 1409-10.
39 Id. at 1409.
40 Id. at 1409, 1410 n.7 (quoting People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 63-64, 365 N.W.2d
56, 67 (1984)).
41 Id. at 1409 n.6.




waivers would not lead to confusion.44
Finally, Justice Stevens refuted the State's contention that the
defendants in Jackson had validly waived their rights. Instead, the
Court decided to extend Edwards to the sixth amendment.45 Thus,
the Court held that when a request for counsel is made at an ar-
raignment or similar proceeding, police may not begin any interro-
gation without counsel unless the accused first initiates the
communication and then knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
waives his rights. 46 Applying this new rule to the facts, Justice Ste-
vens found that the written waivers given in response to police-initi-
ated interrogation were insufficient to establish a knowing,
intelligent and voluntary waiver.
47
B. THE CONCURRENCE
Chief Justice Burger filed a concurring opinion, stating that he
was compelled by the doctrine of stare decisis to follow the Edwards
rule in Jackson.48 Nevertheless, he argued that the prophylactic rules
the Court has developed to protect the accused from self-incrimina-
tion have gone too far.49 Quoting Justice Cardozo, Chief Justice
Burger concluded that "more and more 'criminal[s]... go free be-
cause the constable has blundered.' "50
C. THE DISSENT
Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices
Powell and O'Connor joined. Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the
majority's reasoning that because sixth amendment rights are more
important than fifth amendment rights, the rule of Edwards should
apply to the sixth amendment. 51 He contended that the purpose of
Edwards and the fifth amendment right to counsel is to prevent the
police from "badgering" a suspect into waiving his rights and invol-
untarily incriminating himself.52 Thus, Justice Rehnquist felt that
the question in Jackson was not whether the sixth amendment right is
more important than its fifth amendment counterpart, but whether
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1411.
46 Id. Thus, this waiver rule is the same rule as that adopted in Edwards.
47 Id. at 1410, 1411.
48 Id. at 1411 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
49 Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring). ChiefJustice Burger did not state which prophylac-
tic rules to which he referred.
50 Id. at 1411 (Burger, C.J., concurring)(quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21,
150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926)).
51 Id. at 1412 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
52 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the prophylactic reasons for creating the Edwards rule are present in
the sixth amendment context. 53 Answering this question in the neg-
ative, he concluded that the Court should not have extended Ed-
wards to the sixth amendment.
5 4
He also argued that the majority, without explaining its deci-
sion, limited the "rule to those defendants foresighted enough or
just plain lucky enough, to have made an explicit request for counsel
which we have always understood to be completely unnecessary for
Sixth Amendment purposes." 55 The majority's decision to limit
Jackson to those who request counsel left the Court in "an analytical
strait-jacket."' 56 Because the sixth amendment serves different pur-
poses than the fifth amendment, Justice Rehnquist would not have
applied the "bright-line" rule of Edwards to sixth amendment waiver
cases. 57
IV. ANALYSIS
In Jackson, the Court developed an important new standard of
pre-trial waiver for the sixth amendment right to counsel. Once a
defendant requests counsel, the police may not interrogate him in
the absence of counsel unless he initiates communication with the
police and then waives his right to counsel. 58 Since the application
of the Jackson rule is limited to situations where a defendant requests
counsel, however, the Court must still clarify the waiver standard
where no such request is made. Further, it is not certain whether
the post-Edwards ruling defining "initiation," i.e., Oregon v. Brad-
shaw,59 will also apply in the sixth amendment context. As an aid to
understandingJackson, this analysis includes a review of the fifth and
sixth amendments rights to counsel, a discussion of the develop-
ment of the sixth amendment waiver doctrine, and an analysis of the
shortcomings of the Jackson rule with suggested solutions to un-
resolved questions.
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Court has held that both the fifth and sixth amendments
53 Id. at 1413 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
54 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
55 Id. at 1414 (Rehnquist,J., dissenting).
56 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
57 Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 1411.
59 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). In Bradshaw, the Court held that an accused iniates commu-
nication with the police when he "evince[s] a willingness and a desire for a generalized
discussion about the investigation" and is not merely making a "necessary inquiry aris-
ing out of the incidents of the custodial relationship." Id. at 1045-46.
1986]
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guarantee the right to counsel. Although the explicit language of
the fifth amendment does not provide for the right to counsel,60 the
Court, in Miranda v. Arizona, held that such a right was necessary to
protect an accused's fifth amendment guarantee against compelled
self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. 61 Custodial inter-
rogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." 6 2
The Court strengthened Miranda in Edwards by creating a strict
prophylactic rule. The Court held that once an accused has ex-
pressed a desire to deal with the police only through counsel, the
police may not conduct further interrogation in the absence of
counsel until the accused "intiates further communication, ex-
changes, or conversations with the police," 63 and then validly waives
his counsel rights.64 The Court later defined interrogation as "ex-
press questioning" or words or actions by the police that "are rea-
sonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." 65 Edwards sets forth a "bright-line" rule, in the absence of
which "the authorities through 'badger[ing]' or 'overreaching'-ex-
plicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional-might otherwise wear
down an accused and pursuade him to incriminate himself notwith-
standing his earlier request for counsel's assistance." '66
B. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The language of the sixth amendment, in contrast to the fifth
amendment, explicitly provides for the right to counsel, but limits
that right to assistance during "criminal prosecutions." 67 This right
60 The fifth amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land
or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service or time of War or public
danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
61 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966).
62 Id. at 444; see also supra note 27.
63 Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
64 Id. at 484, 485. See also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984)("Courts may admit
[a defendant's] responses to further questioning only on finding that he (a) initiated
further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right
he had invoked.").
65 Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980).
66 Smith, 469 U.S. at 98 (citations ommitted).
67 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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is "indispensable to the fair administration of our adversarial system
of criminal justice," 68 because it ensures that the accused is pro-
vided with a spokesman or advisor69 who is familiar with the "intri-
cacies of the law."' 70 Therefore, it serves different, and perhaps
more important, purposes than the fifth amendment right.
In Powell v. Alabama,71 the Court hinted that to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the sixth amendment and to guarantee due process, the
right to counsel should include representation at pre-trial proceed-
ings.72 The Court, in United States v. Ash, 73 found that this right ex-
tended back to "critical stages" of the proceedings 74 because the
guarantee of" 'Assistance' would be less than meaningful if it were
limited to the formal trial itself."' 75 For example, in United States v.
Wade76 and Gilbert v. California,77 the Court held that the presence of
counsel at post-indictment pre-trial lineups was necessary to "pre-
serve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial." 78
The Court abandoned this case-by-case analysis of when the
right to counsel attaches by adopting a per se rule in Kirby v. Illi-
nois.79 Kirby held that the right to counsel attaches at the initiation
of "adversary judicial proceedings."80 The attachment of the sixth
amendment signifies the change in the criminal justice system from
68 Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 483 (1986).
69 United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 312 (1973).
70 Id. at 309.
71 287 U.S. 45 (1932). In Powell, the defendants' trials began six days after arraign-
ment but counsel were not appointed until the morning of the trials. The Court found
that "during perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defend-
ants .. .when consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally
important, the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense." Id. at 57.
72 See id. at 57.
73 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
74 See, e.g., Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54-55 (1961), where the Court found
that preliminary arraignment is a critical stage of the proceeding.
75 Ash, 413 U.S. at 310.
76 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
77 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
78 Wade, 388 U.S. at 227 (1967); see also Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 272. On the other hand,
in Gilbert, the Court also held that the uncounseled, pre-indictment taking of handwrit-
ing exemplars was not a critical stage of the proceedings because there was only a "mini-
mal risk" of violating the right to a fair trial. Id. at 267. The Court distinguished
handwriting samples from line-ups by stating that, unlike identifications made at pre-
trial line-ups, the defendant "has the opportunity for a meaningful confrontation of the
[State's] case at trial" by presenting, for example, his own handwriting experts. Id. In
other words, since any evidence of guilt found in handwriting samples can easily be
refuted at trial while line-up identifications cannot, the Court found that the protections
of the sixth amendment were only necessary for the latter.
79 406 U.S. 608 (1972).
80 Id. at 688.
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inquisitorial and investigatorial to accusatorial and adversarial. 8 1 In
other words, after the sixth amendment attaches, the government
"may no longer employ techniques for eliciting information from an
uncounseled defendant that might have been entirely proper at an
earlier stage of their investigation.- 8 2 It is at this point that the right
to counsel becomes necessary to guarantee the right to a fair trial.
The Court has continued to rely on Kirby, applying it, for example,
in Jackson to determine when the defendants' sixth amendment
rights had attached.
83
C. VIOLATIONS OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT
Once the sixth amendment has attached, the next question is
whether the state violated the amendment's guarantee of counsel.
Determining whether the state violated a defendant's rights often
depends on whether the defendant waived his right to counsel.
Waiver, however, is relevant only in certain situations. When police
attempt to deliberately elicit information by surreptitious means, the
issue of waiver is irrelevant because the defendant is unaware that
he is speaking with the police. On the other hand, when the defend-
ant wishes to proceed at trial pro se or when the police interrogate
the defendant in the absence of counsel, waiver of the sixth
81 See Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1409 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.
Ct. 1135, 1146 (1986)("[The sixth amendment] becomes applicable only when the gov-
ernment's role shifts from investigation to accusation."); Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct.
445, 453 (1985)("[Our system] assures that a conviction will not be secured by in-
quisatorial means."); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54 (1949)("Ours is the accusatorial
as opposed to the inquisitorial system"). See also Grano, Rhode Island v. Innis: A Need to
Reconsider the Constitutional Premises Underlying the Law of Confessions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1
(1979). Professor Grano states that an attempt to violate the sixth amendment right
runs contrary to "the constitutional mandate that the system proceed, after some point,
only in an accusatorial manner." Id. at 35.
82 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1409. The Court cited United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264
(1980) (surreptitious employment of a cellmate), Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477
(1986) (electronic surveillance of conversation with third party), and Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (electronic surveillance of conversation with third party), to
provide examples of techniques that police may not use after this point.
83 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1407, 1408. The Court has also used the Kirby analysis in
other cases. In United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984), the Court held that
administrative segregation of prisoners suspected of murders did not trigger the initia-
tion of adversary judicial proceedings, indicating that the sixth amendment right had yet
to attach. The Court also found that adversary judicial proceedings had not begun in
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 n.4 (1980), where a post-arrest discussion be-
tween police officers resulting in an uncounseled confesssion did not implicate the pris-
oner's sixth amendment rights. On the other hand, the Court found that these
proceedings had begun in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 269 (1980), where the
post-indictment use of a jailhouse informant violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel.
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amendmend right to counsel is the vital issue.8 4 WhileJackson falls
into this second category, a brief review of both categories is neces-
sary to fully understand the new waiver rule.
1. Deliberate Elicitation
In Massiah v. United States,85 the Court held that incriminating
information "deliberately elicited" from the defendant in the ab-
sence of counsel must be excluded from evidence.8 6 In Massiah, a
co-defendant, acting as a undercover agent, arranged a meeting in
his car with the defendant.8 7 Unbeknownst to the defendant, the
police had equipped the car with microphones.88 Thus, the police
were able to overhear the pair's conversation during which the de-
fendant made incriminating statements. 89 Relying on his concur-
ring opinion in Spano v. New York, 90 Justice Stewart, writing for the
majority, concluded that allowing police to surreptitiously obtain in-
criminating information from the defendant in this manner under-
mined the purpose of the sixth amendment guarantee. 91 The sixth
amendment prohibits such deliberate elicitation of a defendant's
statements.
The Massiah analysis remained dormant for many years92 until
the Court returned to the deliberate elicitation standard in United
States v. Henry.93 In Henry, the government placed an informant in
the defendant's cell to obtain incriminating information.94 The
Court held that the state violated the defendant's sixth amendment
right to counsel by attempting to deliberately elicit incriminating
statements in the absence of counsel and intentionally creating "a
84 See Note, Proposed Requirements for Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right To Counsel, 82
CoLuM. L. REv. 363, 381-91 (1982).
85 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
86 Id. at 206.
87 Id. at 203.
88 Id. at 202-03.
89 Id. at 203.
90 360 U.S. 315 (1959). In Spano, the Court held that a post-indictment confession
obtained after an all night session of interrogation violated the defendant's sixth amend-
ment right to counsel and thus had to be excluded from evidence. Justice Stewart stated
that "the absence of counsel when this confession was elicited was alone enough to
render it inadmissable under the [Sixth and] Fourteenth Amendment[s]." Id. at 326
(Stewart, J., concurring).
91 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206.
92 In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court purportedly used the delib-
erate elicitation standard set out in Massiah but confused commentators by calling the
police's actions "tantamount to interrogation." Id. at 399 & n.6, 400. For a more com-
plete explanation of Williams and the confusion it caused, see infra notes 110-113 and
accompanying text.
93 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
94 Id. at 266.
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situation likely to induce [the accused] . . . to make incriminating
statements." 95 More recently, the Court, in Maine v. Moulton,96
found illegal a state attempt to use a co-defendant to surreptitiously
elicit incriminating statements. 97 Moulton clarified the Massiah stan-
dard by holding that any attempt by the state to deliberately elicit
incriminating information from an accused or to knowingly exploit
an opportunity to "confront the accused without counsel being
present," violates the sixth amendment.98
"[T]he concept of knowing and voluntary waiver of Sixth
Amendment rights . . . [did] not apply" in Massiah, Henry and
Moulton because the defendants were in communication with "un-
disclosed undercover informant[s] acting for the Government," 99
and thus, did not know to whom they were speaking. Massiah and its
progeny are important because they indicate that once the sixth
amendment attaches, the police, whether through coercive or non-
coercive means, may not attempt to subvert in any manner a defend-
ant's right to have counsel act as a "medium"' 100 between him and
the state.'10 While a violation of the fifth amendment right to coun-
sel depends on the coerciveness of the state's actions, the sixth
amendment's prohibition of deliberate elicitation indicates that the
sixth amendment has a lower threshold for violation, and is at least
as important as, if not more important than, the fifth amendment
right.
2. Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right
Realizing that the sixth amendment needed a waiver standard
as strong as its fifth amendment counterpart, the Jackson majority
extended the fifth amendment Edwards waiver rule to the sixth
amendment. 0 2 There are two basic situations in which sixth
amendment waiver is an issue: (1) when a defendant desires to pro-
ceed at trial pro se, and (2) when the police interrogate a defendant
in the absence of counsel. In the landmark decision Johnson v.
Zerbst,103 the Court defined a waiver as a knowing and intelligent
95 Id. at 274.
96 106 S. Ct. 477 (1986).
97 Id. at 489, 490.
98 Id. at 487.
99 Henry, 447 U.S. at 273.
100 Moulton, 106 S. Ct. at 487.
101 See Kamisar, Brewer v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What is Interrogation? When
does it Matter?, in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY,
139, 169-176 (1980).
102 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1408, 1409.
103 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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relinquishment of a constitutional right. 10 4 Further, the Court
stated that "the determination of whether there has been an intelli-
gent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon
the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, includ-
ing the background, experience and conduct of the accused."' 05
According to Zerbst, therefore, waiver of the sixth amendment right
to counsel consists of two distinct elements: 1) comprehension of
the right to counsel and 2) affirmative relinquishment of that
right. 106
Applying the Zerbst waiver standard in Faretta v. California,'0 7 the
Court determined that a defendant could waive his right to counsel
in order to proceedpro se at trial.10 8 In Faretta, the Court focused on
the "comprehension" element of the Zerbst standard.' 09 The Court
held that for a defendant to represent himself at trial, "he should be
made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation
so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open.' "110 Further, the defendant has
the burden of showing that he understands the right he is relin-
quishing."'1 Thus, the Court has developed a clear and fairly strin-
gent comprehension standard for those who desire to proceedpro se.
The Court, however, has not looked at a defendant's compre-
hension of his right when the state attempts to show waiver during
police interrogation. Instead, the Court has focused on the second
prong of the Zerbst standard, "relinquishment.""12 When a defend-
ant attempts to proceed pro se he clearly desires to relinquish his
sixth amendment right. Relinquishment, on the other hand, is not
as obvious when the police attempt to admit non-counseled confes-
sions or other incriminating statements into evidence. The Court
confronted such a situation in Brewer v. Williams.113
In Williams, the defendant, a religious man, was accused of kill-
ing a young girl. Although the police promised Williams' lawyers
104 Id. at 464; accord Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723, 724 (1948)(plurality
opinion of Black, J.).
105 Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 464.
106 Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977); See Note, Sixth Amendment Right To
Counsel: Standards for Knowing and Intelligent Pretrial Waivers, 60 B.U. L. REV. 738, 752
(1980).
107 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
108 Id. at 835-37.
109 Id. at 835; see also Note, supra note 106, at 750.
110 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942)).
111 Id. at 835.
112 See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404-05; Note, supra note 106, at 752.
113 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
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that they would not question him, the detective in charge of the in-
vestigation pleaded with Williams to help the police locate the girl's
body so that her parents could have "a Christian burial for this little
girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve and mur-
dered." 114 In response, Williams made several incriminating state-
ments and disclosed where he buried the girl. 115 The Court held
that the detective's "Christian burial speech" was "tantamount to
interrogation"' 16 and violated Williams' sixth amendment rights be-
cause, in his attempt to obtain a confession, the detective tried to
circumvent Williams' lawyers.' 17 Unlike the other "deliberate elici-
tation" cases, 118 however, Williams knew that the persons con-
fronting him were government agents. So before the Court could
find that the "Christian burial speech" violated Williams' sixth
amendment right, it had to determine whether he had waived his
right to counsel.
Relying on Zerbst, the Court first noted that the state has the
burden to prove "relinquishment" and that "courts indulge in every
reasonable presumption against waiver." a 9 The Court then found
that Williams' incessant reliance on his lawyers, together with the
lack of any affirmative indication that he desired to relinquish his
right to counsel, showed that there was no waiver. 120 Because the
police tried to elicit information from Williams without attempting
to obtain a waiver of his right to counsel, the State failed to meet its
burden. 121 Unfortunately, though, the Williams Court did not pro-
vide a clear rule for sixth amendment waivers, but instead continued
to rely on a case-by-case analysis of the issue. This lack of clarity
114 Id. at 392, 393.
115 Id. at 393.
116 Id. at 399 & n.6, 400. After Williams, it was not clear whether the Court had raised
the sixth amendment standard from "deliberate elicitation" to "interrogation." See
Kamisar, supra note 101, at 141-60, 168-75. For example, the Court stated that "the
clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an
individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him."
Williams, 430 U.S. at 401 (emphasis added). The clear rule of Massiah, though, is that
once the sixth amendment attaches, a defendant has a right to counsel regardless of
whether police interrogate him. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964);
Kamisar, supra note 101, at 168. The Court laid this confusion to rest two years later
when it clearly returned to "deliberate elicitation" in Henry. See supra text accompanying
notes 92-95.
117 Williams, 430 U.S. at 406.
118 See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct 477 (1986); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S.
264 (1979); McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356 (1965)(per curiam); Massiah, 377 U.S. 201
(1964).
119 Williams, 430 U.S. at 404 (citations ommitted).
120 Id. at 404.
121 Id. at 405.
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became more evident after Edwards enunciated a straightforward
rule for fifth amendment waivers.'
22
In Williams, the defendant's comprehension of his right to coun-
sel was never questioned by the Court, 23 which instead focused on
the relinquishment prong of the waiver standard.' 24 Similarly, the
Jackson Court, apparently assuming that the defendants understood
"the dangers and disadvantages"'' 25 of speaking to the police with-
out counsel, focused on relinquishment. 26 Although it is highly un-
likely the defendants in Jackson understood their rights in the Faretta
sense, the Court's extension of Edwards to the sixth amendment pro-
vides clearer guidelines by which to judge a defendant's purported
waiver during police interrogation. By holding that once asserted
the right to counsel cannot be waived, unless the defendant initiates
communication with the police, the Court has created a clear, pre-
cise, prophylactic rule which not only' protects defendants' rights
but is easily construable by both courts and the police.' 27
Nonetheless, the Court, by emphasizing the defendant's re-
quest for counsel, 28 unnecessarly limits the application of its im-
proved sixth amendment waiver standard. Hinging the application
of Edwards on a request for counsel is logical in the fifth amendment
context, because such a request is needed to invoke the fifth amend-
ment right to counsel. 129 No request is needed, however, to invoke
the sixth amendment right 30 which automatically attaches at the
122 See Note, supra note 84, at 364-65.
123 "It is true that Williams had been informed of and appeared to understand his
right to counsel." Williams, 430 U.S. at 404.
124 See supra note 112.
125 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975). See infra note 142 and accompany-
ing text for an analysis of the Court's failure to discuss comprehension in Jackson and
Williams.
126 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1410-11.
127 Clear guidance to courts and police is considered one of Miranda's major virtues.
Note, Proposed Requirements, supra note 84, at 365 n.18 & n.20 (citing Harryman v. Estelle,
616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 860 (1980) and Schulhofer, Book Review,
79 MicH. L. REV. 865 (1981)).
128 "It is obvious that, for the Court, the defendant's request for counsel is not merely
'an extremely important fact'; rather, it is the only fact that counts." Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at
1414 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
129 Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484, 485. Also, the statement in Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506 (1962), that "where assistance of counsel is a constitutional requisite, the right to be
furnished counsel does not depend on a request," id. at 513 (emphasis added), implies
to the contrary that where the right is not a constitutional requisite, as in the fifth
amendment, a request is required to invoke the right.
130 Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Jackson note this. Jackson, 106 S. Ct.
at 1409 n.6 ("[I]n construing respondents' request for counsel, we do not, of course,
suggest that the right to counsel turns on such a request."); id. at 1414 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting)("[A] defendant's right to counsel does not depend at all on whether the
defendant has requested counsel."); See also Williams, 430 U.S. at 404 ("[T]he right to
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outset of adversary judicial proceedings.'13 The Court, therefore,
has limited the use of the Jackson rule by a factor which is seemingly
irrelevant in the sixth amendment context. The Court explains its
position by stating that "the defendant's request [is] an extremely
important fact in considering the validity of a subsequent waiver in
response to police-initiated interrogation."'' 32 The request, the
Court feels, is a strong indication that the defendant does not wish
to relinquish his sixth amendment right to counsel.' 3 3 Therefore,
the Court hinges the application of Jackson on this factor.
D. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The Court's failure to define what waiver standard applies to
those defendants who are not "foresighted enough, or just plain
lucky enough, to have made an explicit request for counsel"' 1 4 be-
lies the apparent clarity of Jackson. Further, the Court must deter-
mine whether its holding in Oregon v. Bradshaw,135 defining
"initiation" in the fifth amendment context, will apply to the sixth
amendment rule. The Court must address these issues before its
waiver doctrine will provide all defendants with effective and sub-
stantial protection of their sixth amendment rights.
1. Waiver When No Request For Counsel Is Made
The Court in Jackson may have placed itself "in an analytical
strait-jacket"' 3 6 by putting such a great emphasis on the accused's
request for counsel. To extricate itself from this untenable position,
the Court will have to determine what protections are due to a de-
fendant who does not make a request.
The Court should not provide a defendant who fails to request
counsel with fewer protections than one who does. As the Court
stated, the request is important only "in considering the validity of a
subsequent waiver in response to police-intiated interrogation."'
137
Nonetheless, a defendant who has not requested counsel deserves
counsel does not depend on a request by the defendant."); Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S.
506, 513 (1962)("[I]t is settled that where the assistance of counsel is a consititutional
requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request.").
131 Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
132 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1409 n.6.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1414 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
135 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). In Bradshaw, the Court defined initiation as any indication
that an accused wanted a "generalized discussion about the investigation." Id. at 1045-
46. See supra note 59 and infra text accompanying notes 143-47.
136 Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1414 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1409 n.6.
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the same protections as one who does. Emphasizing the request is
not equivalent to abandoning the basic tenet that a request is not
needed to invoke the sixth amendment right. Hence, at a minimum,
the Court should construct protections for these defendants with a
relinquishment standard equivalent to those in Jackson. The con-
frontation between the state and the defendant is no less critical be-
cause of a failure to request counsel.
To shore up this weakness, the Court has three apparent op-
tions. First, the Court could find that signed waivers given after Mi-
randa-type warnings are sufficient for a valid waiver. Second, the
Court could create a stricter standard than Jackson, holding that the
right to counsel can only be waived in front of a neutral judicial
officer. Finally, the Court could exclude all statements given in re-
sponse to police-initiated interrogations regardless of whether a re-
quest has been made or not.
Prior to Jackson, several circuits adopted, in various forms, the
first option: requiring only a signed waiver in response to Miranda-
type warnings.' 38 While there may be some administrative advan-
tages to this approach, because it permits police to proceed with
interrogation with minimal delays, adopting the fifth amendment
standard ignores the greater importance of the sixth amendment
right.'3 9 Further, such warnings fall significantly short of satisfying
the Faretta comprehension standard by failing to guarantee that the
defendant fully understands the dangers and disadvantages of relin-
quishment. An additional reason to adopt a more stringent stan-
dard than the fifth amendment rule is that once the sixth
amendment attaches, the government supposedly has "legally suffi-
cient evidence of the defendant's guilt."' 40 Therefore, a waiver
138 The First Circuit found a valid waiver where the defendant was informed of the
indictment in addition to Miranda warnings. United States v. Payton, 615 F.2d 922 (1st
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 969 (1980). The Fifth and Sixth Circuits required only
Miranda warnings and a willingness to talk. Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 920
(1980). The Eighth Circuit found a waiver after Miranda warnings, previous invocation
of the right to counsel and the opportunity to consult counsel during interrogation.
Fields v. Wyrick, 706 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1020 (1983). The
Ninth Circuit held that waiver could be found after the defendant was given Miranda
warnings and was informed that adversary judicial proceedings had begun. United
States v. Karr, 742 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1984). Finally, the Eleventh Circuit found that
Miranda warnings alone were sufficient. Tinsley v. Purvis, 731 F.2d 791 (11th Cir.
1984).
139 See Fields v. Wyrick, 464 U.S. 1020, 1022 (Marshall,J., dissenting); United States v.
Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1146-1149 (2d Cir. 1980).
140 People v. Waterman, 9 N.Y.2d 561,565, 175 N.E.2d 445,447, 216 N.Y.S.2d 70, 74
(1961); accord United States v. Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1148 (2d Cir. 1980); Note, supra
note 84, at 387 & n.162.
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given in response to Miranda warnings is neither of great use to the
government, nor does it properly protect a defendant's sixth
amendment rights.
The second option, validating a waiver only in the presence of a
neutral judicial officer, would provide greater protection for an ac-
cused who does not request counsel than for one who makes such a
request. Therefore, such a rule would be inconsistent with Jackson's
mandate of emphasizing the request. This standard, adopted by the
second circuit prior to Jackson in United States v. Mohabir,14 1 would
ensure that the Faretta comprehension standard is met before find-
ing a waiver. A major drawback to this approach, though, is that it
would increase delays in prosecution. In light of Jackson, where the
Court chose to emphasize relinquishment rather than comprehen-
sion at the pre-trial stage, adopting this standard for one who does
not request counsel would be illogical and inconsistent.
The final option, adopting the Jackson rule in all sixth amend-
ment situations regardless of whether or not the defendant has re-
quested counsel, would enable the Court to logically extricate itself
from its self-imposed "strait-jacket." This standard would provide
all defendants with equivalent sixth amendment protections and
would be stricter than the Edwards standard because no request
would be needed to invoke the rule. The Court could still maintain
its emphasis on the request by ruling that a request would make it
more difficult to find a subsequent waiver after defendant-intitated
communication. This rule would also be in line with the no-request
doctrine of the sixth amendment. Further, a single standard for
every sixth amendment case would provide a clear, simple and easily
applicable rule to both the police and the courts because all defend-
ants, regardless of whether they requested counsel, would be
treated similarly.
One failure of this option, and perhaps the major weakness of
Jackson, is that by placing such a great emphasis on relinquishment,
it tends to ignore the comprehension issue during police interroga-
tion. The Court has not yet reconciled its seemingly different views
on comprehension in pre-trial waivers given during police interro-
gation and in pro se waivers like that in Faretta.'42 It is unclear why
141 624 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1980).
142 In Jackson, the Court only discussed comprehension in the context of the defend-
ants' invocation of his right to counsel, not waiver. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. at 1409, 1410 n.7
("When an accused requests an attorney before a police officer or a magistrate, he does
not know what constitutional right he is invoking."). In Wifiams, the issue is barely
discussed at all. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977)("It is true that Williams
had been informed of and appeared to understand his right to counsel.").
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one who desires to be his own counsel at trial has a greater burden
to show comprehension than do the police who are trying to vali-
date a waiver so that they can admit incriminating evidence. The
Court's emphasis on relinquishment by creating a tough, per se
standard in Jackson, though, may have obviated the need to consider
comprehension at all in these situations. Regardless, in light ofJack-
son, the Court should eliminate the request requirement so that all
defendants' sixth amendment rights are protected equally.
2. Definition of Initiation
The Court must also determine whether its ruling in Oregon v.
Bradshaw,143 defining initiation under Edwards, will also apply to
Jackson. In Bradshaw, the Court held that the accused had initiated
communication with the police when, after requesting counsel and
invoking Edwards, he asked the police "'Well, what is going to hap-
pen to me now?' "144 The Court found this simple question satis-
fied the first prong of Edwards because it "evinced a willingness and
a desire for a generalized discussion about the investigation; it was
not merely a necessary inquiry arising out of incidents of the custo-
dial relationship."
1 45
Justice Marshall in dissent felt that this bare inquiry alone did
not meet the first prong, stating instead that the Edwards Court
meant to define initiation to include only invitations to further inter-
rogation by the police in the absence of counsel. 46 Such an invita-
tion can only be found when an accused "reopens the dialogue
about the subject matter of the criminal investigation." 147 Injustice
Marshall's view, the accused's question in Bradshaw only evinced a
desire to find out where he was being taken and did not relate to the
criminal investigation. 148
The definition of intitiation is crucial to the strength of the
waiver standard. A low threshold, like Bradshaw, will undercut the
effectiveness ofJackson by providing little protection for the unwary
prisoner. For example, lower courts, in applying the Bradshaw stan-
dard, have sometimes glossed over the requirement of intitiation to
find a valid waiver. 149 On the other hand, a strict definition of intia-
143 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). See supra note 59.
144 Id. at 1042.
145 Id. at 1045-1046.
146 Id. at 1053 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
147 Id. at 1054 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148 Id. at 1055 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 See, e.g., Lamp v. Farrier, 763 F.2d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 1985)(initiation by accused
found when police ask what the lawyer said, followed by defendant asking whether he
was under arrest and what the charge was); United States v. Obregon, 748 F.2d 1371,
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tion, such as that proposed by Justice Marshall, will enhance a de-
fendant's right and make it more difficult to find a waiver. The
question arises then, whether, in light of the heightened importance
of the sixth amendment, as opposed to the fifth amendment the
Court should adopt a stricter rule to apply in Jackson situations.
The Court should adoptJustice Marshall's definition to provide
greater protection for the more important sixth amendment right.
The major drawback to this approach is that it might create confu-
sion for both lower courts and police because it involves the use of
two different standards in somewhat similar situations. Because the
Court should make its rules as simple and clear as possible, multiple
standards will only make it more difficult for police to know the con-
stitutional limits for each type of interrogation. Nonetheless, be-
cause a fair trial depends on the sixth amendment right to counsel
and because the police must respect that right,150 the benefits of a
stricter sixth amendment initiation definition outweigh any potential
burdens.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Jackson developed a strong sixth amendment
waiver standard but limited its applicability to those defendants who
make a request for counsel. The per se rule taken from Edwards,
ordering the police to halt interrogation once counsel is requested,
1380-81 (10th Cir. 1984)(accused's asking what would happen to him if he told agent
what she wanted to know after police began interrogation is initiation); United States v.
Kroesser, 731 F.2d 1509, 1520 (11th Cir. 1984)(expression of regret of involving co-
defendant in crime sufficed for initation); United States v. Bentley, 726 F.2d 1124, 1127
(6th Cir. 1984)(court ignored question of initiation and instead viewed waiver as the
only issue). Further, one court refused to find intiation when police began the conversa-
tion, but nevertheless showed hostility towards the initiation requirement. United States
v. Renda, 567 F. Supp. 487, 489-90 (E.D. Va. 1983)(Judge Warriner expressed dislike of
per se rule).
On the other hand, several courts have encountered situations in which the defend-
ants' "initiation" would appear to satisfy both the majority rule in Bradshaw and the
Marshall standard. Willie v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 1372, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1984)(asking
jailor to speak with police); United States v. Morrow, 731 F.2d 233, 234-35 (4th Cir.
1984)(asking what search of girlfriend's apartment revealed); United States v. Montgom-
ery, 714 F.2d 201, 202-03 (1st Cir. 1983) (asking whether he was being charged with
possession of each gun); Elbert v. Cunningham, 616 F. Supp. 433, 435-36 (D.N.H.
1985) (asking with what he was charged); United States v. Gazzara, 587 F. Supp. 311, 325
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)(asking what agents wanted to know). In addition, in United States v.
Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1131-32 (5th Cir. 1984)(government asking question and ac-
cused's responding), the court found that the accused did not initiate the
communication.
150 See Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484-85 (1986) ("The Sixth Amendment also
imposes on the State an affirmative obligation to respect and preserve the accused's
choice to seek this assistance [of counsel]").
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should prevent future violations of the sixth amendment rights of
defendants who request counsel. The Court's reliance on the re-
quest for counsel as the critical factor in determining waivers, how-
ever, is misplaced in the sixth amendment context. As a result, the
Court should extend the Jackson rule to those defendants who fail to
request counsel. The Court must also clearly define "initiation" for
the sixth amendment rule, preferably adopting Justice Marshall's
standard in Oregon v. Bradshaw. Jackson indicates that the Court,
when judging waiver during custodial interrogation, will continue to
rely solely on a determination of whether a defendant has relin-
quished his sixth amendment right and will continue to ignore the
question of whether a defendant in a custodial environment truly
comprehends the right he is waiving. Hence, the Court must con-
front the two unresolved issues beforeJackson's per se rule will effec-
tively protect all defendants' right to counsel.
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